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Abstract
We develop a model of social choice over lotteries, where people’s psycho-
logical characteristics are mutable, their preferences may be incomplete, and
approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being are possible. Formally, we
suppose individual preferences are described by a von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) preference order on a space of lotteries over psychophysical states; the
social planner must construct a vNM preference order on lotteries over social
states. First we consider a model when the individual vNM preference order is
incomplete (so not all interpersonal comparisons are possible). Then we consider
a model where the individual vNM preference order is complete, but unknown to
the planner, and thus modeled by a random variable. In both cases, we obtain
characterizations of a utilitarian social welfare function.
Most models of social welfare and collective choice take one of two positions. Ei-
ther there is no possibility of interpersonal comparisons of well-being, or there exist
complete interpersonal comparisons of some specific welfare information. However,
starting with Sen (1970b), several authors have considered a compromise between
these extremes; while acknowledging that ‘precise’ interpersonal comparisons of well-
being might be impossible, these authors argue that certain ‘approximate’ interper-
sonal comparisons are sometimes obvious, and thus, should be incorporated into any
reasonable ethical theory.1 Sen et al consider generalizations of the utilitarian social
∗I am grateful to O¨zgu¨r Evren, Klaus Nehring, Efe Ok, and Clemens Puppe for their helpful
comments on early drafts of this paper. I am especially grateful to Marc Fleurbaey, Franz Dietrich,
and two anonymous referees for their many detailed and valuable comments. None of these people
are responsible for any errors or deficiencies which remain. The final work on this paper was done
while visiting the Universite´ de Montre´al Department of Economics; I thank the UdeM and CIREQ
for their hospitality. This research was also supported by NSERC grant #262620-2008.
1See Sen (1970b, 1972 and Ch.7* of 1970a), Fine (1975), Blackorby (1975), Basu (1980, Ch.6),
and Baucells and Shapley (2006, 2008).
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welfare function, where each person’s preferences could be represented by any member
of a family of utility functions, and interpersonal comparisons could be made using
any element of a convex cone of weight vectors. The result is a partial ordering over
the set of social alternatives which, while incomplete, is still much more complete than
the Pareto order. However, these authors still make two other assumptions:
(a) Each person has complete preferences (or a complete personal welfare ordering)
over the space of social alternatives.
(b) Each person has fixed psychological characteristics. Psychological changes are
not part of the set of social alternatives. (Thus, we cannot change someone’s
preferences, or the psychological factors which influence her sense of well-being).
A companion paper (Pivato, 2010a) has developed a model of ‘approximate interper-
sonal welfare comparisons’ which relaxes assumptions (a) and (b). In that model,
there is a space Φ of ‘personal physical states’ and a space Ψ of ‘personal psycho-
logical states’, and each individual in society is characterized by an ordered pair
(ψ, φ) ∈ Ψ × Φ. Both the physical state φ and the psychological characteristics ψ
are mutable, and hence potential objects of individual or social choice. Pivato (2010a)
postulates an incomplete preorder ( ) on the space Ψ×Φ of all possible psychophys-
ical states. The statement (ψ1, φ1) (ψ2, φ2) means that psychophysical state (ψ1, φ1)
is objectively better than (or would be universally preferred to) state (ψ2, φ2).
Pivato (2010b) develops a model of (incomplete) social preferences, based on the
interpersonal preorder ( ) proposed in Pivato (2010a); the main result is a characteri-
zation of the ‘approximate maximin’ social preorder. Pivato (2010c) instead supposes
it is possible to approximately compare the utility gains (or losses) which different
citizens experience as a result of a policy; this leads to the ‘approximate utilitarian’
social preorder. However, all of these models apply only to riskless decisions. The
present paper introduces risk to the model.
Like Pivato (2010b,c), this paper supposes there is a set X of ‘psychophysical
states’. (This could be the space Ψ×Φ of Pivato (2010a), but it doesn’t have to be.)
Each citizen, at each moment, is located at some point in X , so that the social state is
described by a vector x ∈ X I (where I is a set indexing the citizens). Pivato (2010b)
posited a preorder ( ) on X (an objective —but possibly incomplete —comparison
of the relative welfare or happiness of different psychophysical states), and used this
to derive a ‘social preorder’ (D ) on X I . To model risky decisions, we must instead
consider preferences over lotteries. So, Section 1 of this paper introduces a general
model of incomplete interpersonal lottery preferences. Section 2 introduces a model
of preference aggregation called a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) social preorder.
This paper’s first main result (Theorem 2.1) shows that the ‘approximate utilitarian’
preorder is a subrelation of every other ‘reasonable’ vNM social preorder. Section 3
illustrates with an application to bilateral bargaining.
Next, Section 4 introduces an entirely different model of approximate interper-
sonal preferences over lotteries, in the form of a ‘random’ vNM utility function on
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X . Using this framework, Section 5 contains the paper’s other main result: a ‘profile-
independent’ verson of Harsanyi’s (1955) Social Aggregation Theorem, with approxi-
mate interpersonal comparisons (Theorem 5.2). Finally, Section 6 uses the framework
of Section 4 to argue for the instrumental value of personal liberty. All proofs are in
an appendix at the end of the paper.
It is first necessary to address a serious philosophical objection to the social ag-
gregation of vNM preferences over lotteries. Harsanyi’s (1953) Impartial Observer
Theorem, Harsanyi’s (1955) Social Aggregation Theorem, and Myerson’s (1981) ‘no-
timing’ theorem all interpret the utilitarian social welfare function as a sum of vNM
utility functions.2 However, Sen (1976, 1977) has rejected this approach. Sen dis-
tinguishes a person’s ‘true’ utility function (which measures the actual ‘welfare’ or
‘happiness’ which she would receive from various alternatives) from her vNM utility
function (which conflates her true utility function with her intrinsic risk aversion).
Juan and Sue may have the same true utility function, but exhibit different vNM
functions, because Juan relishes the thrill of gambling while Sue suffers from anxiety
attacks. Thus, the sum of vNM utility functions proposed by Harsanyi (1953, 1955)
and Myerson (1981) is the not the ‘true’ utilitarian SWO which would have been
advocated by Bentham or Sidgwick.3
There are at least two responses this objection. One response is to argue that, at
least for risky social decisions, the sum of vNM utility functions is the correct objective
function for the social planner, because it reflects the aggregate risk preference of the
citizens, in addition to the aggregate of their ‘true’ utilities. If the social planner
maximized the expected sum of the citizens’ true utility functions, instead of the
expected sum of their vNM functions, then society might end up taking risks which the
citizens themselves would not wish to take (or vice versa); this would be paternalistic.
However, while it seems desirable to respect the ‘aggregate risk preference’ of the
citizens, it isn’t clear that the sum of vNM functions is the right way to compute
this ‘aggregate risk preference’ —precisely because the vNM functions conflate risk
preferences with true utility functions. (If it were somehow possible to isolate the
‘pure risk preferences’ of each citizen from her vNM function, then perhaps the correct
‘aggregator’ would be the minimum, or maximum, or product of these risk preferences;
this question needs further analysis.) Furthermore, this entire argument falls apart for
riskless social decisions: why should people’s risk preferences influence social choice
in a setting without risk?
There is another response to Sen’s objection. Instead of summing the vNM util-
ity functions of the citizens themselves, we could sum the vNM utility functions of
sympathetic and risk-neutral proxies or delegates acting on their behalf. Imagine that
risk-loving Juan appoints a risk-neutral delegate, Janos, while risk-averse Sue appoints
2Of course, a vNM preference defines a two-dimensional family of vNM utility functions, which
are all affine transformations of one another. So to meaningfully speak of ‘summing vNM utility
functions’, we presume there is some rule which selects a canonical representative from each of these
families. (In fact, in the present paper, this issue will never arise.)
3See Harsanyi (1975, 1977), Weymark (1991) and Roemer (1996;§4.3) for further discussions of
the Sen-Harsanyi debate.
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a risk-neutral delegate, Zsuzsanna. Being Juan’s delegate, Janos wants exactly the
same things Juan wants (at least, in a riskless context), so they have the same true
utility function. But since Janos is risk-neutral, his vNM function is equal to his true
utility function (and thus, equal to Juan’s).4 Likewise, Zsuzsanna’s vNM function is
equal to Sue’s true utility function. Thus, if we sum the vNM functions of Janos and
Zsuzsanna, as proposed by Harsanyi (1953, 1955) and Myerson (1981), then we are
actually computing the ‘true’ utilitarian SWO of Bentham and Sidgwick.
This interposition of imaginary ‘delegates’ may seem artificial, but in fact it merely
extends the reasoning already present in Harsanyi’s original thought experiments,
which imagine a ‘neutral but sympathetic observer’ who acts on behalf of the citizens.
Thus, throughout this paper, when I speak of the lottery preferences or vNM utility
functions of the citizens, I will assume that all citizens are either risk-neutral, or are be-
ing represented by risk-neutral ‘delegates’. (If the social planner also wishes to respect
the ‘aggregate risk preference’ of the citizens, then this must be done ex post facto.)
1 von Neumann-Morgenstern interpersonal preorders
Let X be a measurable space (i.e. a set equipped with a sigma-algebra), and let P(X )
be the set of all probability measures on X . Let P ⊆ P(X ) be any convex subset
of P(X ). (For example: P might be the set of all probability measures which are
absolutely continuous with respect to some fixed reference measure µ. Or, P might
be the set of all measures satisfying some ‘regularity’ conditions with respect to a
given topology on X .) A von Neumann-Morgenstern preorder on P is a reflexive,
transitive (but possibly incomplete) binary relation ( ) on P which satisfies the
following ‘Linearity’ axiom:
(Lin) For all ρ, ρ′1, ρ
′
2 ∈ P and s, s
′ ∈ (0, 1) with s + s′ = 1,
(
ρ′1  ρ
′
2
)
=⇒(
(sρ+ s′ρ′1)  (sρ+ s
′ρ′2)
)
.
Now suppose X s a set of ‘personal psychophysical states’. Each element x ∈ X
encodes all information about an individual’s current psychology (i.e. her personality,
mood, knowledge, beliefs, memories, values, desires, etc.) and also all information
about her current personal physical state (i.e. her health, wealth, physical location,
consumption bundle, sense-data, etc.).5 Thus, any human being, at any moment in
time, resides at some point in X . A preorder on X thus represents a model of human
4Someone might object: even if Janos is risk-neutral, his vNM preferences are simply his ‘pref-
erences over lotteries’, and not necessarily indicative of his ‘true utility function’. I invoke Occam’s
razor: aside from his true utility function and his ‘intrinsic risk preferences’, what else could influence
Janos’s preferences over lotteries? Indeed, it seems reasonable to define his ‘risk preference’ to be
simply the deviation between his vNM function and his true utility function; then my claim about
Janos is true by definition.
5Like Pivato (2010b,c), but unlike Pivato (2010a), this model does not assume we can separate
someone’s ‘psychological’ state from her ‘physical’ state. Indeed, if the mind is a function of the
brain, then her psychological state is simply one aspect of her physical state.
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welfare where individuals may have incomplete preferences (because not all x, y ∈ X
are comparable), but where ‘approximate’ interpersonal comparisons of well-being
may be possible (because every possible human mind is represented by some subset
of X ). Pivato (2010a,b) calls this an interpersonal preorder.
If P ⊆ P(X ), then a vNM preorder ( ) on P represents a model of approximate
interpersonal comparisons and incomplete preferences over lotteries; we will call this a
von Neumann-Morgenstern interpersonal preorder (vNMIP). For all x ∈ X , let δx ∈ P(X )
be the point mass at x (i.e. δx{×} = 1), and suppose δx ∈ P. Then ( ) defines an
interpersonal preorder (
∗
) on X by (x
∗
y) ⇐⇒ (δx δy). Thus, a vNMIP is a
natural extension of the model of Pivato (2010a,b).
Multiutility representations. For any ρ ∈ P(X ) and measurable function v :
X−→R, we define
v∗(ρ) :=
∫
X
v(x) dρ[x]. (1)
Let V be a collection of measurable functions v : X−→R. We can define a vNMIP
( ) on P as follows: for any ρ, ρ′ ∈ P,(
ρ ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(
v∗(ρ) ≥ v∗(ρ′) for all v ∈ V
)
. (2)
We say that V provides a multiutility representation for ( ).
Fix a topology on P. We say that ( ) is continuous if the following holds: for
all ρ, ρ′ ∈ P, and sequences {ρn}
∞
n=1 and {ρ
′
n}
∞
n=1, if ρn−−−−n→∞→ρ and ρ
′
n−−−−n→∞→ρ
′, and
ρn  ρ
′
n for all n ∈ N, then ρ  ρ
′. In several settings, any continuous vNM preorder
admits a multiutility representation like (2). For example, suppose |X | = N is finite,
and P is the simplex in RN , which we endow with the obvious Euclidean topology.
Then any continuous vNM preorder on P has a multiutility representation (Baucells
and Shapley, 1998, Theorem 1.8, p.12).
Now let X be a compact metric space, and let P be the space of all Borel probability
measures on X , endowed with the weak* topology induced by the set C(X ) of all
continuous real-valued functions on X . Then any continuous vNM preorder on P has
a multiutility representation (Dubra et al., 2004).
Next, let X be a sigma-compact metric space, and let Pc be the space of com-
pactly supported Borel probability measures with the weak* topology induced by
C(X ). Then any continuous vNM preorder on Pc has an expected multiutility rep-
resentation (Evren, 2008, Thm.2). Also, if P is the space of all Borel probability
measures on X , and ( ) is a continuous vNM preorder on P such that the set of
point-masses in P has a ( )-maximal element and a ( )-minimal element, then
( ) has a multiutility representation (Evren, 2008, Thm.3).
However, let X = R, and let P be the space of Borel probability measures on R,
endowed with the weak* topology from the space Cb(R) of bounded continuous real-
valued functions. Then Evren (2008, Prop.1) has shown that some continuous vNM
preorders on P do not admit expected multiutility representations.
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2 von Neumann-Morgenstern social preferences
Let I be a finite set indexing a population. A social state is a vector x ∈ X I , assigning
a psychophysical state xi to each i ∈ I. Any policy chosen by the social planner will
result in a probability distribution ρ over X I . To decide the ‘best’ policy, the social
planner must formulate a preference relation (D ) over P(X I). For any ρ ∈ P(X I),
and any i ∈ I, let ρi ∈ P(X ) be the lottery on the ith coordinate induced by ρ. That
is, for any measurable subset U ⊂ X ,
ρi[U ] := ρ
{
x ∈ X I ; xi ∈ U
}
. (3)
For any convex subset P ⊆ P(X ), let P⊗I :=
{
ρ ∈ P(X I) ; ρi ∈ P, ∀ i ∈ I
}
; this is
a convex subset of P(X I).
If σ : I−→I is a permutation, and x ∈ X I , then we define σ(x) := x′, where
x′i := xσ(i) for all i ∈ I. For any ρ ∈ P(X
I), we define σ(ρ) := ρ′ as follows:
For any measurable subset U ⊆ X I , ρ′[U ] := ρ
[
σ−1(U)
]
. (4)
It is easy to check that σ[P⊗I ] = P⊗I . If ( ) is a vNMIP on P, then a ( )-
social preference order (or ( )-vNMSP) is a preorder (D ) on P⊗I with the following
properties:
(Par) For all ρ,ρ′ ∈ P⊗I , if ρi  ρ
′
i for all i ∈ I, then ρEρ
′. Also, if ρi ≺ ρ
′
i for all
i ∈ I, then ρ ⊳ρ′.
(Anon) If σ : I−→I is any permutation, then for all ρ ∈ P⊗I , ρ
△
≡ σ(ρ).
(Lin) For all ρ1,ρ2,ρ
′
1,ρ
′
2 ∈ P
⊗I , and s, s′ ∈ [0, 1] with s + s′ = 1, if ρ1Eρ2 and
ρ′1Eρ
′
2, then (sρ1 + s
′ρ′1)E (sρ2 + s
′ρ′2).
Axiom (Par) is simply the Pareto axiom, and Axiom (Lin) is just the von Neumann-
Morgenstern linearity axiom. Axiom (Anon) makes sense because the elements of I
are merely ‘placeholders’, with no psychological content —recall that all information
about the ‘psychological identity’ of individual i is encoded in xi. Thus, if x,y are
two social alternatives, and xi 6= yi, then it may not make any sense to compare the
welfare of xi with yi (unless such a comparison is allowed by ( )), because xi and
yi represent different people (even though they have the same index). On the other
hand, if xi = yj, then it makes perfect sense to compare xi with yj, even if i 6= j,
because xi and yj are in every sense the same person (even though this person has
different indices in the two social alternatives).6
6See (Pivato, 2010b, §3) for more discussion of (Anon) and (Par).
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Approximate utilitarianism. Fix ρ ∈ P⊗I . For all i ∈ I, let ρi ∈ P be as in
eqn.(3). Define the per capita average lottery
ρ :=
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
ρi ∈ P. (5)
The approximate utilitarian ( )-vNMSP (D
u
) is then defined:
∀ρ,ρ′ ∈ P⊗I ,
(
ρD
u
ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(
ρ ρ′
)
. (6)
The first main result of this paper is:
Theorem 2.1 Let ( ) be a vNMIP on P. Every ( )-vNMSP on P⊗I extends and
refines the approximate utilitarian ( )-vNMSP (D
u
). That is, for any ρ,ρ′ ∈ P⊗I,(
ρD
u
ρ′
)
=⇒
(
ρDρ′
)
, and
(
ρ ⊲
u
ρ′
)
=⇒
(
ρ ⊲ρ′
)
.
Theorem 2.1 implies that the set of ‘(D )-optimal’ policies will be closely related to
the set of ‘(D
u
)-optimal’ policies, according to any of the four concepts of ‘optimality’
which exist for incomplete preorders (Pivato, 2010b, Lemma A.1(g)).
Representation with utility functions. A utility function for ( ) is a measurable
function u : X−→R such that, for all ρ1, ρ2 ∈ P,(
ρ1 ρ2
)
=⇒
(
u∗(ρ1) ≥ u
∗(ρ2)
)
, (7)
where u∗ is defined as in eqn.(1). Let U( ) be the set of all utility functions for ( ).
The next result connects (D
u
) to the more traditional definition of utilitarianism.
Proposition 2.2 Let ( ) be a vNMIP on P and let ρ,ρ′ ∈ P⊗I.
(a) If ρD
u
ρ′, then
∑
i∈I
u∗(ρi) ≥
∑
i∈I
u∗(ρ′i) for all u ∈ U( ).
(b) Conversely, if
∑
i∈I
u∗(ρi) ≥
∑
i∈I
u∗(ρ′i) for all u ∈ U( ), and ( ) admits a
multiutility representation (2), then ρD
u
ρ′.
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3 Application: Interpersonal utility comparisons
and bilateral bargaining
Suppose X = Ψ × Φ, where Ψ is a space of ‘personal psychological states’ and Φ is
a space of ‘personal physical states’. Thus, at any moment, any person is described
by an ordered pair (ψ, φ), where ψ encodes her personality, mood, knowledge, beliefs,
memories, values, desires, etc., while φ encodes her her health, wealth, physical loca-
tion, consumption bundle, etc. (Pivato, 2010a, §1). For any ψ ∈ Ψ, we suppose that ψ
has a complete vNM preference relation (
ψ
) defined on the lottery space P({ψ}×Φ),
and the vNM interpersonal order ( ) agrees with (
ψ
) when restricted to P({ψ}×Φ).7
For any u : Ψ × Φ−→R, let uψ : Φ−→R be the restriction of u to {ψ} × Φ. For any
ρ ∈ P(Φ), define u(ψ, ρ) := u∗ψ(ρ), as in equation (1).
A social alternative is now an ordered pair (ψ,φ) ∈ ΨI × RI , which assigns a
psychophysical state (ψi, φi) to each i ∈ I. A vNMSP is an (incomplete) preorder
(D ) on P(ΨI × ΦI). Fix ψ (i.e. allow no psychological changes). Then (D
u
) induces
a preference order ( D
u,ψ
) on P(ΦI), where, for all ρ,ρ′ ∈ P(ΦI)(
ρ D
u,ψ
ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(
(δψ ⊗ ρ) D
u
(δψ ⊗ ρ
′)
)
. (8)
(Here δψ ∈ P(Ψ
I) is the ‘sure thing’ probability measure with δψ{ψ} = 1). If the
vNMIP ( ) has a multiutility representation (2), then Proposition 2.2 and statement
(8) together yield:(
ρ D
u,ψ
ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(∑
i∈I
u(ψi, ρi) ≥
∑
i∈I
u(ψi, ρ
′
i), for all u ∈ U( )
)
. (9)
Fix u0 ∈ U( ). For all u ∈ U( ) and i ∈ I, there exist constants wi = wi(u) ∈ R+
and bi = bi(u) ∈ R such that, for all φ ∈ Φ, we have u(ψi, φ) = wi · u0(ψi, φ) +
bi (because both u(ψi, •) and u0(ψi, •) are vNM cardinal utility functions for the
vNM preference order (
ψi
)). For any u ∈ U( ), define the ‘weight vector’ w(u) :=
(wi(u))i∈I ∈ R
I
+. Next, define W :=
{
w(u) ; u ∈ U( )
}
⊆ RI+. Then statement (9)
becomes:(
ρ D
u,ψ
ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(∑
i∈I
wi · u0(ψi, ρi) ≥
∑
i∈I
wi · u0(ψi, ρ
′
i), for all w ∈ W
)
. (10)
(The constants {bi(u)}i∈I are irrelevant because they cancel from both sides of the
right-hand inequality in (9), for any fixed u ∈ U( ).)
In particular, suppose I = {1, 2}; then W ⊆ R2+. Let A := inf {w1/w2 ; w ∈ W}
and A := sup {w1/w2 ; w ∈ W}. As shown in Figure 1, define a preorder ( ◮
u,ψ
) on R2
7This is a ‘nonpaternalism’ condition, analogous to axiom (IP1) in Pivato (2010a).
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Figure 1: Contour sets for the relation ( ◮
u,ψ
). Left: the upper contour set of r. Middle: the
lower contour set of r. Each contour set contains three disjoint regions, corresponding to the three
possible conditions implying the relation r′ ◮
u,ψ
r (or vice versa). Right: The incomparable regions{
r
′ ∈ R2 ; r′ ◮6 ◭ r
}
. For reference, we also show the indifference curve of the classical utilitarian
SWO.
as follows: for all r, r′ ∈ R2,
(
r′ ◮
u,ψ
r
)
⇐⇒
either (A) r′1 ≥ r1 and r′2 ≥ r2;or (B) r′1 ≥ r1, r′2 ≤ r2 and S ≥ −A;
or (C) r′1 ≤ r1, r
′
2 ≥ r2, and S ≤ −A
 , (11)
where S :=
r′2 − r2
r′1 − r1
is the slope of the line through r and r′.
Proposition 3.1 Let ρ,ρ′ ∈ P(ΦI), and for i ∈ {1, 2}, let ri := u0(ψi, ρi) and r
′
i :=
u0(ψi, ρ
′
i), to obtain vectors r and r
′ in R2. Then
(
ρ′ D
u,ψ
ρ
)
⇐⇒
(
r′ ◮
u,ψ
r
)
.
Bilateral bargaining. Let B ⊂ R2 be some compact, convex set —for example,
the set of feasible utility profiles in a bilateral bargaining problem. Classic bargaining
solutions prescribe a small (usually singleton) subset of B —typically by maximizing
some social welfare order defined on R2. However, an incomplete preorder like ( ◮
u,ψ
)
may not have any ‘maximal’ points in B. Instead, the appropriate bargaining solution
in this context is the weakly undominated set:
wkUnd
(
B, ◮
u,ψ
)
:=
{
b∗ ∈ B ; b∗ 6◭
u,ψ
b, ∀ b ∈ B
}
.
If b ∈ B, then b is weakly ( ◮
u,ψ
)-undominated iff the wedge
{
r′ ∈ R2 ; r′ ◮
u,ψ
r
}
shown
in Figure 1(A) intersects B only at b. Thus, if P is the Pareto frontier of B, then
wkUnd
(
B, ◮
u,ψ
)
⊆ P. Furthermore, if b ∈ P, and T is the slope of the tangent line
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Figure 2: The approximate utilitarian bargaining solution wkUnd
(
B, ◮
u,ψ
)
.
to P at b, then b ∈ wkUnd
(
B, ◮
u,ψ
)
if and only if −A ≤ T ≤ −A;8 see Figure
2. If (D ) is any other vNMSP, and we define a preorder ◮
ψ
on R2 by analogy to
Proposition 3.1, then Theorem 2.1 implies that (◮
ψ
) must extend and refine ( ◮
u,ψ
).
Thus, wkUnd
(
B, ◮
ψ
)
⊆ wkUnd
(
B, ◮
u,ψ
)
(Pivato, 2010b, Lemma A.1(g)). Thus, the
bargaining solution proposed by any vNMSP must be contained in the approximate
utilitarian bargaining solution.
4 Stochastic utility functions
We will now consider a completely different model of approximate interpersonal utility
comparisons. Suppose there exists a complete vNM preference order ( ) on P(X ),
described by a vNM utility function u : X−→R, which, in principle, would allow us to
make precise interpersonal comparisons of well-being. However, the exact structure
of ( ) is unknown to us. We can model this by representing u as a random variable.
Formally: let Ω be a probability space, and treat u as a measurable function u :
X × Ω−→R. Call u a stochastic utility function.
Example 4.1 (a) Let Ψ be a space of personal psychological states, and Φ is a space
of personal physical states, as in §3. Suppose that each ψ ∈ Ψ has a (complete) vNM
preference order (
ψ
) on P(Φ), which is known to us, and which can be described by a
(known) vNM utility function vψ : Φ−→R. However, the different utility functions in
{vψ}ψ∈Ψ are expressed on different ‘scales’, and the correct interpersonal calibration
is unknown to us. Formally: for all ψ ∈ Ψ, there are (unknown) constants aψ > 0 and
bψ ∈ R, such that, for all φ ∈ Φ, the ‘true’ well-being of (ψ, φ) is given by aψ vψ(φ)+bψ.
We don’t know the vectors a := (aψ)ψ∈Ψ ∈ R
Ψ
+ and b := (bψ) ∈ R
Ψ so we model them
as random variables. Thus, in this model, Ω := RΨ+ × R
Ψ (with some probability
8If b is a corner point of P, then this inequality must hold for all tangent lines at b.
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measure), X := Ψ × Φ, and the stochastic utility function u : X × Ω−→R is defined
by u(ψ, φ, a,b) := aψ vψ(φ) + bψ, for all (ψ, φ, a,b) ∈ Ψ× Φ× R
Ψ
+ × R
Ψ.
(b) Suppose we know how to calibrate the utility functions {vψ}ψ∈Ψ relative to one
another; thus, we can assemble a global utility function v : Ψ× Φ−→R, so in princi-
ple we could make precise interpersonal comparisons. However, we have incomplete
knowledge of the true psychological type of each person (as in a Bayesian game).
There is a space Ξ of ‘publicly visible’ personality types, in addition to the space of
‘true’ psychological types Ψ. (For example, the fact that someone appears outwardly
cheerful or morose is encoded in Ξ. The fact that she is truly happy or unhappy is
encoded in Ψ). If a person’s visible personality is ξ ∈ Ξ, then her true psychological
type ψ(ξ) ∈ Ψ is unknown to us, and thus modelled as a random variable. Formally:
let Ω be a probability space, and let ψ : Ξ× Ω−→Ψ be a measurable function. Then
define u : Ξ × Φ × Ω−→R by u(ξ, φ, ω) := v[ψ(ξ, ω), φ]. Thus, if X := Ξ × Φ, we
obtain a stochastic utility function u : X × Ω−→R. ♦
5 A stochastic social aggregation theorem
Let A be a set of social alternatives, and let P(A) be the set of lotteries over A. Let
I be a set of individuals. Harsanyi (1955, 1976) presented the following argument for
utilitarianism.
Social Aggregation Theorem. For each i ∈ I, let (
i
) be a vNM preference
relation on P(A), represented by vNM utility function ui : A−→R. Let (D ) be the
social planner’s vNM preference relation over P(A), and suppose (D ) satisfies:
(Par) For any ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(A), if ρ
i
ρ′ for all i ∈ I, then ρD ρ′.
Then there are nonnegative constants {ci}i∈I ⊂ R+ such that (D ) is represented by
the vNM utility function U : A−→R defined by U(a) :=
∑
i∈I
ciui(a) for all a ∈ A. 2
Unfortunately, because of its ‘single-profile’ framework, the SAT is not an argu-
ment for utilitarianism. It does not prescribe a particular weighted utilitarian social
welfare function which the social planner must employ, independent of the profile of
individual vNM preferences. Instead, the SAT says that, given a profile {
i
}i∈I of
individual vNM preferences, and given a collective vNM preference (D ) (generated
through whatever means), if (D ) satisfies (Par) for the profile {
i
}i∈I , then (D ) can
always be ‘rationalized’ as weighted utilitarianism ex post facto, by a suitable choice
of weights {ci}i∈I . These weights might depend on the particular profile {
i
}i∈I . A
proper characterization of utilitarianism must specify some weights independent of the
particular profile {
i
}i∈I , and use them for all conceivable profiles.
9
9See Weymark (1991) or Mongin (1994) for further discussion.
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The ‘stochastic utility function’ model of §4 yields a profile-independent version of
the SAT with approximate interpersonal comparisons. For any ρ ∈ P(X I) and i ∈ I,
let ρi ∈ P(X ) be the projection of ρ onto the ith coordinate, defined in eqn.(3) of §2.
Fix ω ∈ Ω, and let u∗(ρi, ω) be the ρi-expected value of u, given ω. That is:
u∗(ρi, ω) :=
∫
X
u(xi, ω) dρi[xi].
Given ω, assume that individual i has a preference relation (
ω,i
) over P(X I) defined
by (ρ
ω,i
ρ′) ⇐⇒ (u∗(ρi, ω) ≤ u
∗(ρ′i, ω)). This is a vNM preference relation on P(X
I),
with vNM utility function uωi : X
I−→R defined by uωi (x) := u(xi, ω).
Suppose the social planner wishes to formulate a complete preorder (D ) over
P(X I). If (D ) satisfied the vNM axioms, then it could be represented by a vNM
utility function U : X I−→R. The problem is that the correct choice of U may depend
on the true value of ω, which is unknown to the planner. For any measurable subset
S ⊆ Ω, if the planner ‘observes’ S (i.e. if she acquires enough information to know that
ω ∈ S), then we suppose she formulates a vNM preference relation (D
S
) on P(X I),
described by a vNM utility function US : X
I−→R. Let S be the sigma-algebra on Ω
and let π : S−→[0, 1] be the probability measure governing the random variable ω.
We suppose that the family {US}S∈S of utility functions on X
I satisfies the following
‘Bayesian consistency’ condition:
(Bayes) For any x ∈ X I and any countable collection {Sn}
∞
n=1 ⊂ S of disjoint mea-
surable sets, if S =
∞⊔
n=1
Sn and π(S) > 0, then US(x) =
1
π(S)
∞∑
n=1
π(Sn)USn(x).
Intuitively, this says that the family {US}S∈S behaves as if US(x) is the expected value
of the unknown ‘true’ social utility of x, conditioned on the observation S. Indeed,
we have the following:
Lemma 5.1 Suppose the family {US}S∈S satisfies (Bayes). Then there exists a mea-
surable function U : X I × Ω−→R such that, for any S ∈ S and x ∈ X I,
US(x) =
1
π(S)
∫
S
Uω(x) dπ[ω]. (12)
Intuitively, Uω : X−→R is the vNM utility function which the planner would
employ if she knew that the true value was ω. Let (D
ω
) be the vNM preference
relation on P(X I) represented by Uω. For all ω ∈ Ω, we assume (D
ω
) satisfies the
following axioms:
(Par) For all ρ,ρ′ ∈ P(X I), if ρ 
ω,i
ρ′ for all i ∈ I, then ρ E
ω
ρ′.
(Anon) If σ : I−→I is any permutation, then for all ρ ∈ P(X I), ρ
△
≡
ω
σ(ρ) [where
σ(ρ) is defined by eqn.(4) in §2].
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(Nonindiff) The ordering (D
ω
) is not totally indifferent over P(X I).
(Welf) There exists a function F : RI−→R such that, for any ω ∈ Ω and x ∈ X I , if
ri := u(xi, ω) for all i ∈ I, then Uω(x) = F (r).
The meanings of axioms (Par), (Anon), and (Nonindiff) are clear. Axiom (Welf) says
that the function U is ‘formally welfarist’ —that is, Uω(x) is entirely determined by
the values of u(xi, ω) (for all i ∈ I), independent of ω.
10 Loosely speaking, this ensures
that U cannot assign more ‘weight’ to some values of ω than others.
For any S ∈ S, define uS : X−→R by
uS(x) :=
1
π(S)
∫
S
u(x, ω) dπ[ω], for all x ∈ X . (13)
In words: uS(x) is the expected value of the random variable u(x), conditional on
observing the event S. The second main result of this paper is as follows:
Theorem 5.2 Let {(D
S
)}S∈S be a S-indexed collection of vNM preference relations
on P(X I) satisfying axioms (Bayes), (Par), (Anon), (Nonindiff), and (Welf). Then
for any S ∈ S, the vNM relation (D
S
) is represented by the vNM utility function
US : X
I−→R defined by
US(x) :=
∑
i∈I
uS(xi), for all x ∈ X
I. (14)
This model obviates the ‘single-profile’ criticism of Harsanyi’s original SAT. By
hypothesis, X × Ω encodes the space of all possible human psychologies which could
ever exist; hence u encodes all possible vNM preference relations which could ever
manifest in any profile. Thus, Theorem 5.2 does not presuppose any particular profile;
it prescribes US as the social welfare function which the social planner must employ
when she observes event S, independent of the ‘profile’ u which actually obtains.
For practical purposes, this model does not require the social planner to have
precise information about people’s true preferences. The hidden variable ω could
contain a lot of information; in terms of Example 4.1(a), the model is even applicable
when Ψ is trivial, so that all information about people’s true preferences is hidden
from the social planner. However, the model does require the social planner to have a
correct model of the probability distribution of preferences, even if she doesn’t know
which preferences actually obtain (i.e. the planner must know the vNM function
u : X × Ω−→R, even if she doesn’t know the true value of ω).
6 The value of liberty
Welfarist social choice theory has been criticized for not recognizing the value of per-
sonal liberty.11 Let A be a set of alternatives, and suppose individual i has utility
10d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002; §3.3.1, pp.489-494) discuss ‘formal welfarism’.
11Dowding and van Hees (2009) provide a good summary of this debate.
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function ui : A−→R. Let a
∗ be the ui-maximal element of A. Intuitively, we feel
that a social policy which allows i to choose a∗ herself is more desirable than a social
policy which forces a∗ upon her —even though both policies yield the same utility for
i. Formally, we can imagine a policy which allows i to choose any element from some
subset F ⊆ A; the larger F is, the more ‘freedom’ it offers i, and hence, the more
desirable the policy.
However, this account is puzzling, because by definition, elements of the set A are
supposed to encode all information relevant to i’s happiness or well-being, as measured
by ui. Furthermore, any ‘freedom’ offered by F is clearly a function of the ‘quality’ of
the elements of F as well as their quantity. For example, if F ′ is obtained by adding
an extremely undesirable option (e.g. ‘execution at dawn’) to F , then we would not
feel that F ′ offers i ‘more freedom’ than F . This is because when i ‘freely chooses’
an element from F , we suppose that what she really does is solve an optimization
problem; adding options which are obviously grossly suboptimal does not enhance
her optimization opportunities. However, if this ‘optimization’ view of free choice is
correct, then once F contains the global optimum a∗, it seems superfluous to add any
other options, because any other element of A is suboptimal, relative to a∗. Hence
any measure of ‘freedom’ which accounts for the ‘quality’ of elements in F leads us
back to welfarism. In short: ‘optimality vitiates liberty’.
The ‘stochastic utility’ model of §4 furnishes at least two rebuttals of this ‘vitiation’.
The first is an argument originating with Mill (1859). Liberty is salutary because by
making choices, i cultivates her ability to process and evaluate complex information
and forecast the long-term consequences of her actions; she also develops her self-
confidence and her sense of personal responsibility. Furthermore, there is a certain kind
of satisfaction which she can achieve only by exercising personal autonomy. Formally,
suppose X = Ψ×Φ as in Example 4.1(a), and individual i currently has psychophysical
state (ψi, φi). The ‘vitiation’ argument implicitly assumed that A ⊆ {ψ} ×Φ. But in
fact the structure of A depends on who does the choosing. If the planner chooses φ∗,
then i changes from state (ψi, φi) to (ψi, φ
∗). But by allowing i herself to identify and
freely choose φ∗, the planner triggers a change from her current psychological state ψi
to a new and better state ψ̂i —a psychological change which could not be caused by
any other means. Since (ψ̂i, φ
∗)≻ (ψi, φ
∗), it is socially better to allow i to choose φ∗
freely.
However, the ‘salutary’ defense of liberty has its limits. First, there are diminishing
returns. Consider a person whose rational choice skills are already highly developed;
perhaps someone who has made many complex decisions while occupying a position
of great responsibility. Is she really going to experience much personal growth by
deciding what to eat for breakfast?
Second, as observed by Sen (1997, §3), people sometimes don’t want the respon-
sibility of choice. For example, at a dinner party, a guest may wish she could sit in
the most comfortable chair, or could take the choicest cake from a communal plate.
However, she would prefer that these decisions were ‘forced’ upon her (e.g. that the
host insists, or that the other guests take all the other chairs or cakes first), because
to voluntarily take the best chair or cake would appear gauche, and violate her in-
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ternal norms of politesse and/or altruism. Of course, one might argue that freedom
and responsibility are still salutary, whether people want them or not. But people
are sometimes faced with terrible dilemmas (e.g. ‘Sophie’s Choice’ scenarios) where,
instead of gratifying and edifying, the exercise of personal choice is agonizing and
psychologically destructive.
Third, this argument suggests that there is no moral difference between true liberty
and a convincing illusion of liberty —as long as the citizens believe they are free, we
have fully captured the psychological gains provided by freedom. For example, stage
magicians and con artists often appear to offer their subjects a ‘free choice’, when
in fact the outcome is completely determined in advance. This does not seem like
freedom worth having.
But there is another, entirely different rebuttal of the ‘optimality vitiates liberty’
argument: it assumes that we know the ui-optimal element of A, because we know
ui. In reality, our knowledge of ui is imperfect. Even in a purely welfarist framework,
liberty then acquires instrumental value: by offering i a larger feasible set F to freely
choose from, we increase the probability that F contains her true optimum a∗ (which
is unknown to us); more generally, we increase the expected value of max
a∈F
ui(a).
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As in §4, let Ω be a probability space, and u : X × Ω−→R be a stochastic utility
function. Suppose that social policy does not determine a single point x ∈ X I ;
instead, a social policy determines, for each i ∈ I, some subset Fi ⊆ X , leaving i the
freedom to choose any element of Fi. Presumably i chooses arg max
xi∈Fi
u(xi, ω). Let us
refer to the collection (Fi)i∈I as a freedom allocation.
13 Given a choice between two
freedom allocations F := (Fi)i∈I and F
′ := (F ′i)i∈I , a utilitarian social planner will
choose F over F′ if it offers a higher expected utility sum, conditional on individual
optimization; that is, if∫
Ω
∑
i∈I
max
xi∈Fi
u(xi, ω) dω >
∫
Ω
∑
i∈I
max
x′i∈F
′
i
u(x′i, ω) dω.
Thus, even ignoring the potentially salutary effects of personal autonomy, a stochastic
utilitarian may deem it socially optimal to maximize the liberty of citizens.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Without loss of generality, suppose I = [1 . . . I], and define
the permutation σ : I−→I by σ(i) := (i + 1) mod I. Define ρ̂ :=
1
I
I−1∑
n=0
σn(ρ) and
12This is a social choice analog of the concept of ‘preference for flexibility’ developed by Kreps
(1979) and others in the setting of individual choice.
13If i 6= j, then generally, Fi 6= Fj , because people do not have complete freedom to modify their
own psychology. There will also be other constaints on the sorts of freedom allocations the planner
can offer (e.g. resource constraints). Finally, this model unrealistically assumes that each i ∈ I can
choose a point in Fi independent of the choices made by other j ∈ I. In reality, the agents might
interact (e.g. trade) and their choices will be interdependent, resulting in an I-player game.
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ρ̂′ :=
1
I
I−1∑
n=0
σn(ρ′). (Here, σ2 = σ ◦ σ, σ3 = σ ◦ σ ◦ σ, etc.) Then
ρ =
1
I
I−1∑
n=0
ρ
△
≡
1
I
I−1∑
n=0
σn(ρ) = ρ̂. (15)
Here “
△
≡ ” is by I-fold application of axiom (Lin), because ρ
△
≡ σn(ρ) for all n ∈ N,
by axiom (Anon). By a similar argument, ρ′
△
≡ ρ̂
′. Meanwhile, for all i ∈ I, we
have
ρˆi = ρ and ρˆ
′
i = ρ
′, (16)
where ρ and ρ′ are the per capita average lotteries of ρ and ρ′, as defined in eqn.(5).
Thus, (
ρD
u
ρ′
)
⇐
(∗)
⇒
(
ρ ρ′
)
⇐
(†)
⇒
(
ρˆi ρˆ
′
i for all i ∈ I
)
(‡)
=⇒
(
ρ̂D ρ̂′
)
⇐
(⋄)
⇒
(
ρDρ′
)
.
Likewise,
(
ρ ⊲
u
ρ′
)
⇐
(∗)
⇒
(
ρ≻ ρ′
)
⇐
(†)
⇒
(
ρˆi≻ ρˆ
′
i for all i ∈ I
)
(‡)
=⇒
(
ρ̂ ⊲ ρ̂′
)
⇐
(⋄)
⇒
(
ρ ⊲ρ′
)
.
Here, (∗) is by defining formula (6), (†) is by eqn.(16), (‡) is by axiom (Par),
and (⋄) is by eqn.(15) and the transitivity of (D ). 2
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Let ρ and ρ′ be the per capita average lotteries of ρ and ρ′,
as defined in eqn.(5). For any measurable u : X−→R, we have
u∗(ρ) =
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
u∗(ρi) and u
∗(ρ′) =
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
u∗(ρ′i), (17)
because the function u∗ : P−→R is linear. Thus,(
ρD
u
ρ′
)
⇐
(∗)
⇒
(
ρ ρ′
)
(†)
=⇒
(
u∗(ρ) ≥ u∗(ρ′), for all u ∈ U( )
)
⇐
(⋄)
⇒
(∑
i∈I
u∗(ρi) ≥
∑
i∈I
u∗(ρ′i), for all u ∈ U( )
)
,
as desired. Here, (∗) is by defining formula (6); (†) is by statement (7), and (⋄) is
by eqn.(17). This proves (a)
If ( ) admits a multiutility representation (2), then clearly V ⊆ U( ); further-
more, (2) remains true if we substitute V := U( ). Thus, the implication “
(†)
=⇒”
changes to “⇐⇒ ”. This proves (b). 2
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. For any w ∈ W, we have∑
i∈I
wi · u0(ψi, ρ
′
i)−
∑
i∈I
wi · u0(ψi, ρi) =
(
w1r
′
1 + w2r
′
2
)
−
(
w1r1 + w2r2
)
= w1 · (r
′
1 − r1) + w2 · (r
′
2 − r2) = w2 ·
((
w1
w2
)
· (r′1 − r1) + (r
′
2 − r2)
)
.
Thus, statement (10) becomes(
ρ′ D
u,ψ
ρ
)
⇐⇒
((
w1
w2
)
· (r′1 − r1) + (r
′
2 − r2) ≥ 0, for all w ∈ W
)
⇐⇒
either (A) (r′1 − r1) ≥ 0 and (r′2 − r2) ≥ 0; or(B) (r′1 − r1) ≥ 0 ≥ (r′2 − r2) and A · (r′1 − r1) ≥ (r2 − r′2); or
(C) (r′2 − r2) ≥ 0 ≥ (r
′
1 − r1) and (r
′
2 − r2) ≥ A · (r1 − r
′
1).
(18)
If S :=
r′2−r2
r′1−r1
, then condition (B) in statement (18) is equivalent to r′1 ≥ r1, r
′
2 ≤ r2
and S ≥ −A. Meanwhile, condition (C) is equivalent to r′1 ≤ r1, r
′
2 ≥ r2, and
S ≤ −A.
Thus, the right side of statement (18) is equivalent to the right side of statement
(11). 2
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Fix x ∈ X I . Define the function µ
x
: S−→R by µ
x
[S] :=
US(x) · π[S], for all S ∈ S. Axiom (Bayes) says that µx is countably additive (i.e.
µ
x
[
⊔∞
n=1 Sn] =
∑∞
n=1 µx[Sn]); hence it is a sigma-finite signed measure (because π
is a probability measure and |US(x)| <∞ for all S ∈ S). Clearly, µx is absolutely
continuous relative to π [i.e. (π[S] = 0) =⇒ (µ
x
[S] = 0)]. Thus, the Radon-
Nikodym Theorem (Conway, 1990, Thm.C.7, p.380) says there is a S-measurable
function f
x
: Ω−→R such that µ
x
[S] =
∫
S
f
x
(ω) dπ[ω] for all S ∈ S. Now define
U : X I × Ω−→R by Uω(x) := fx(ω), for all x ∈ X
I and ω ∈ Ω. Then for any
x ∈ X I and S ∈ S, we have
US(x) =
µ
x
[S]
π[S]
=
1
π[S]
∫
S
f
x
(ω) dπ[ω] =
1
π(S)
∫
S
Uω(x) dπ[ω],
which yields eqn.(12). 2
Proof of Theorem 5.2. For any ω ∈ Ω, if the vNM preference relation (D
ω
) satisfies
(Par), then Harsanyi’s SAT implies that (D
ω
) can be represented as maximizing the
expected value of a vNM utility function U˜ω : X
I−→R of the form:
U˜ω(x) :=
∑
i∈I
cωi · u
ω
i (x) =
∑
i∈I
cωi · u(xi, ω), for all x ∈ X
I ,
17
for some nonnegative constants {cωi }i∈I ⊂ R+. Axiom (Nonindiff) says at least
one these constants is nonzero, while (Anon) implies that they must all be equal;
hence we can assume without loss of generality that cωi = 1 for all i ∈ I, so that
U˜ω(x) =
∑
i∈I
u(xi, ω) for all x ∈ X
I and ω ∈ Ω.
Now, Uω and U˜ω represent the same vNM preference relation (D
ω
), so there exist
constants a(ω) > 0 and b(ω) ∈ R such that Uω = a(ω) U˜ω + b(ω). That is:
Uω(x) = b(ω) + a(ω)
∑
i∈I
u(xi, ω), for all x ∈ X
I and ω ∈ Ω.
Axiom (Welf) then implies that a(ω1) = a(ω2) and b(ω1) = b(ω2) for all ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω.
Thus, there are constants a > 0 and b ∈ R such that
Uω(x) = b+ a
∑
i∈I
u(xi, ω), for all x ∈ X
I and ω ∈ Ω. (19)
Substituting (19) into (12), we get:
US(x) =
1
π(S)
∫
S
(
b+ a
∑
i∈I
u(xi, ω)
)
dπ[ω]
= b+ a
∑
i∈I
1
π(S)
∫
S
u(xi, ω) dπ[ω] = b + a
∑
i∈I
uS(xi), (20)
and where uS is defined as in eqn.(13). But clearly the vNM utility function US in
eqn.(20) is equivalent to the vNM utility function US in eqn.(14). 2
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